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Abstract. The theory of proper names proposed by J.S. Mill in A system of logic (1843), and 
discussed in S. Kripke’s Naming and necessity (1980), is shown to be predated by A. 
Rosmini’s Nuovo saggio sull’origine delle idee (1830) and T. Reid’s Essays on the intellectual 
powers of man (1785). For philological reasons, Rosmini probably did not obtain his view 
of proper names from Reid. For philosophical reasons, it is unlikely that he got it from 
Hobbes, Locke, Smith, or Stewart. Although not explicitly indicated by Rosmini himself,  
he may have been influenced by St. Thomas, who in Summa theologica discusses suppositum 
and natura in relation to the equivocal functions of the terms ”God” and ”sun” as 
common and proper names. As previously observed, forerunners of the idea can be 
found in Antiquity, in Plato’s Theaetetus and Aristotle’s Metaphysics. From a historical 
point of view, the fully developed ”Millian” opinion that connotation is not a 
fundamental aspect of proper names, and that their referents are not fixed by 
description, could more accurately be termed the Reid-Rosmini-Mill theory. 
 
 
Introduction 
In Naming and necessity, Kripke1 famously proposed that proper names and species 
terms are rigid designators not reducible to descriptions. On this point, he largely agreed 
with J.S. Mill, who in 1843 proposed that proper names lack connotation2. 
Appropriately acknowledging and discussing Mill’s preceding work, Kripke seems 
to have overlooked that the same theory of proper names was launched thirteen years 
earlier by Antonio Rosmini. Perhaps this oversight is due to the fact that Rosmini wrote 
in Italian and was not noticed by Mill. In the interest of history, and considering the 
impact of Kripke’s reasoning, it seems worthwhile to draw attention to some salient 
passages in Rosmini’s Nuovo saggio sull’origine delle idee, which was published anonymously 
in Rome in 1830 and reprinted under the author’s name in Milan, 18363. In Il problema 
filosofico del linguaggio in Antonio Rosmini, Brugiatelli4 instructively exposes Rosmini’s view 
                                                
1 S.A. KRIPKE, Naming and necessity, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, USA 1980.  
2 «Proper names are not connotative: they denote the individuals who are called by them; but they do not 
2 «Proper names are not connotative: they denote the individuals who are called by them; but they do not 
indicate or imply any attributes as belonging to those individuals.» J.S. MILL, A system of logic, ratiocinative and 
inductive, being a connected view of the principles and evidence, and the methods of scientific investigation, vol. 1, John W. 
Parker, London 1843, p. 40. This book and several others in the Bibliography are available as facsimiles 
on the Internet. 
3 A. ROSMINI-SERBATI, Nuovo saggio sull’origine delle idee, vol. 1, Tipografia Pogliani, Milano 1836. 
4 V. BRUGIATELLI, Il problema filosofico del linguaggio in Antonio Rosmini, Edizioni Dehoniane, Bologna 2000. 
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of the differences between proper and common names; however, without placing it in 
perspective of Kripke’s discourse and the modern analytical tradition. 
The following is a comparison of references to Mill in Naming and necessity with 
some passages in Rosmini’s Nuovo saggio. In an attempt to assess the degree of historical 
originality, if any, of the Rosminian and Millian views, attention is also briefly paid to 
the idea of proper names in a number of other salient philosophers. 
                                                   
Similarities between Rosmini, Mill, and Kripke 
That the reference of proper names is fixed by ”baptism” (ostensively or by a kind 
of initial description), is a central theme in Naming and necessity. However, in the Preface 
Kripke5, allegedly in consonance with Mill, defends himself against being interpreted as 
favouring the universal substitutivity of different proper names of one and the same 
referent. He claims that the sentence «Hesperus is Phosphorus» could raise an empirical 
issue, whereas «Hesperus is Hesperus» cannot, indicating that the two sentences are not 
completely interchangeable.  
For «Hesperus is Phosphorus» to be questionable on empirical grounds, for 
someone to whom the planet Venus has not been ostensively demonstrated as the 
Evening star and the Morning star, the names would need to be endowed with the 
capacity of connoting something, so as to remove the analyticity of the sentence. For 
instance, in the case of Hesperus, the connotation could be the attribute ”being 
observed at dusk”6. However, such limited connotation does not suffice to fix the 
referent. 
Rosmini succinctly explains the strictly denotative function of proper names7: 
 
When the common name expresses an individual, it marks and distinguishes it by 
virtue of one of its qualities; whereas the proper name really does not mark and 
distinguish the individual by virtue of one of its qualities, but directly and expressly 
names the very individual and, so to speak, its individuality. Now, the individuality of 
an object is never transferable to another object; because by the individual name you 
express precisely that which a being has exclusively for itself, that which makes it what 
it is and nothing else. So, the proper name can refer to one object only, since, as said, 
it expresses that which makes it unique. […] Thus man denotes a single man and not 
many, but marks him by means of a common quality, humanity; however, not in such 
a way that by this sign alone he appears to me distinct and separate from all other 
men; but, rather, according to the nature of that name I can be led to think 
indifferently upon this man as much as on whoever else. If, when meeting him, I call 
this man by the name Peter, by that sign I have marked him as distinct from all other 
men: and that is so because I have really not deduced the name Peter from a common 
quality but instead chosen it directly to signify that individuality by which Peter has a 
being of his own, distinct and not transferable to all the others. [- - -] 
 
Whether a name is a proper name, or a common name, does not depend on its being 
used to designate one single object, or more. It depends on the manner by which it 
designates them. If it designates them by marking them with a common quality, as 
                                                
5 S.A. KRIPKE, Naming and necessity, cit., pp. 20–21, 26–29. 
6 ivi., pp. 28–29. 
7 A. ROSMINI-SERBATI, Nuovo saggio, cit., pp. 105–107. This and other quotations from Rosmini were 
translated by the present author. 
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does the word man, which marks the men with humanity, it is a common name. If, on 
the other hand, it designates them without marking them with a common quality, but 
directly as individuals, without any other relation between the name and them than 
the one arbitrarily decided by him who invented the name, then this name is a proper 
name. 
 
The irrelevance of connotativity for fixing the referent of a proper name is also 
evident from Rosmini’s fierce arguments with Adam Smith and Dugald Stewart over 
the historical development of proper and common names. According to Smith8 and 
Stewart9, common names have arisen later than proper names as the result of individual 
proper names being applied to more and more objects of the same kind. Rosmini holds 
the opposite view that common names are historically prior to proper names. His 
argument is essentially that proper names do not connote the qualities or attributes that 
are named by the corresponding common names10: 
 
In conclusion: if one claims that a proper name has changed into a common name by 
being successively applied to more individuals, I shall see the following alternatives: 
Either that name is applied to a greater number of individuals, as a proper name of 
everyone, in which case it has not thereby formed a common name, and hence the 
formation of common names is not yet explained. Or, by being applied to more 
individuals it has changed its meaning and instead of signifying the individual as such, 
as it did in the beginning, it has changed into indicating its species, i. e. the individuals, 
by means of a quality common to them; and in that case it remains to be explained 
how this transition has occurred, how the human mind has transformed the idea that 
was initially attached to that word, how the idea of the individual has become replaced 
by the idea of a quality common to many individuals; and consequently how one has 
been able to find this common quality; 
[- - -] 
Surely, as an abusement of the meaning of common name, one could very well label as 
common a proper name that is applied to a collection of individuals, considered as 
individuals, that is to say to three, four or more who have the name Peter in common. 
But that name is not common in the sense that it denotes a species or genus of things, in 
which sense it is taken by the grammarians and is treated in our discourse, aiming at 
explaining how the ideas of species and genus are formed. The common name in the first 
sense no doubt becomes more common, the more individuals to whom it successively 
becomes applied. However, the common name understood in the sense in which it is 
taken in our reasoning, is common already from the beginning and does not become 
more so by being applied to a greater number of individuals. It is in its nature to 
belong to every possible member of the species in question, neither more nor less. 
 
Concerning the significance of species names, Kripke deviates from Mill by 
claiming that «terms for natural kinds are much closer to proper names than is 
ordinarily supposed»11. He regards as outright wrong Mill’s contention that the meaning 
                                                
8 A. SMITH, The theory of moral sentiments. To which is added a dissertation on the origin of languages, A. Millar and A. 
Kincaid, London 1767, pp. 437 ff. 
9 D. STEWART, Elements of the philosophy of the human mind, A. Strahan and T. Cadell, London 1792,  pp. 151 
ff. 
10 A. ROSMINI-SERBATI, Nuovo saggio, cit., pp. 125–127. 
11 S.A. KRIPKE, Naming and necessity, cit., pp. 127–128. 
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of species names, e. g. ”man”12 (”human being”, ”cow”, and ”tiger” in Kripke), is 
determined by a specific collection of attributes connoted by the species name. This 
Millian view, rejected by Kripke, coincides with the one previously proposed by 
Rosmini13: 
 
In contrast, if someone comes up with a common name, for example the name ”man”, 
he does not call only one man by that name, or only those men whom he knows and 
particularly intends to denominate; but directly all those who have or can have 
humanity, that is to say the common attributes that together constitute being a man; and 
this he does not do with many announcements but with that one, that single 
declaration of the name; because that declaration is a general announcement that 
tacitly says: «everyone who has these qualities I call a man». 
Thus, to make this announcement a general and abstract idea is necessary, an idea 
not determined by any particular number, as when one imposes proper names. 
 
Historical perspectives 
Kripke’s breach with the then predominating descriptive theories of referencing 
amounts to a revival of the Millian view as regards proper names. As shown here, the 
Millian understanding of proper names, discussed in Naming and necessity as a historical 
forerunner, was predated by that of Rosmini in Nuovo Saggio. However, Kripke does not 
explicitly refer back in history any further than to Mill on this point. So, the question 
arises as to how original the Rosminian-Millian understanding of proper names is, in 
comparison with that of preceding language philosophers. 
That Rosmini could have got his view of proper names from Stewart or Smith 
seems out of the question. Proposing that the properties of a named particular individual 
could form the basis for generalizing the name into a common one, those authors hold a 
view opposite to that of Rosmini’s regarding the historical development of proper and 
common names. Neither Smith nor Stewart dwell long on proper names per se in order 
to analyse meticulously their function qua proper names, but they are quick to suggest 
the process of generalization14 and so give the impression that connotation is an 
important feature of proper names. 
In contrast, Reid clearly has the same conception of proper names as Rosmini and 
Mill. Although proper names may have certain connotations (e.g. Westminster bridge is 
prima facie a bridge in Westminster), the significance is not fixed by them and cannot be 
defined by description15. Reid writes16: 
 
There are proper names, and there are common names or appellatives. The first are 
the names of individuals. The same proper name is never applied to several individuals 
on account of their similitude, because the very intention of a proper name is to 
distinguish one individual from all others; and hence it is a maxim in grammar, that 
proper names have no plural number. A proper name signifies nothing but the 
                                                
12 J.S. MILL, A system of logic, cit., pp. 38–39.  
13 A. ROSMINI-SERBATI, Nuovo saggio, cit., pp. 124–125. 
14 A. SMITH, The theory of moral sentiments, cit., pp. 437–438; D. STEWART, Elements of the philosophy of the human 
mind, cit., pp. 151–154. 
15 T. REID, Essays on the intellectual powers of man, John Bell, Edinburgh 1785. pp. 367–368. 
16 ivi, p. 494. 
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individual whose name it is; and when we apply it to the individual, we neither affirm 
nor deny any thing concerning him. 
 
The last sentence is a striking parallel to Rosmini’s assertion, translated in the first 
quotation above: «il nome proprio non segna già e distingue l’individuo mediante una 
sua qualità, ma a dirittura nomina espressamente l’individuo stesso, e per dir così, la sua 
individualità» (”the proper name really does not mark and distinguish the individual by 
virtue of one of its qualities” etcetera). Both Reid’s and Rosmini’s expressions emphasize 
the complete irrelevance of connotation for the  fundamental function of proper names. 
Although Rosmini makes several references to Reid in Nuovo Saggio, he does not 
take explicit notice of him in connection with the discussion of proper names. Chapter 3 
of Nuovo Saggio I, Section 3, is specifically devoted to Reid’s philosophical system, but the 
function of proper names is not treated there. Neither are proper names dealt with at 
the many other places in Nuovo Saggio I–III where Reid is referred to. Conversely, Reid is 
not mentioned in the passage where Rosmini thoroughly discusses proper names – i.e. 
Section 3, Chapter 4, articles 1–12, essentially devoted to Stewart. 
Taking into account the intensity with which Rosmini critically scrutinizes Reid’s 
system in general and the emphasis that Rosmini puts on the non-connotativity of 
proper names, and considering that his views of proper names appear identical to 
Reid’s, the absence of any recognition of the agreement with Reid on proper names 
may at first glance seem surprisingly negligent. On second thought one may wonder 
whether Rosmini was in fact unaware of having been predated by Reid on this point. 
In Chapter 3 of Nuovo Saggio I, Reid’s An inquiry into the human mind17 is referred to 
eight times, although not by the original title but in French (seven times) and Italian 
(once) translation. In contrast, Essays on the intellectual powers of man is not cited at all, 
neither in Chapter 3 nor in the relevant twelve articles of Chapter 4 in Nuovo Saggio I. 
This absence of Essays is noteworthy, as it is there that Reid presents his views of names, 
whereas that topic is not covered by An inquiry. It is tempting to suggest that Rosmini 
had not in fact read Essays, and so could not have got his views of proper names from 
there. This explanation is supported by the fact that Rosmini’s well-kept personal library 
at Stresa contains a French translation of An inquiry but no copy of Essays, neither in 
English nor in translation18. 
As for Locke, in Book 3 of An essay concerning human understanding, he asserts that only 
substances have proper names19, substances being defined in Book 220: 
 
The ideas of substances are such combinations of simple ideas, as are taken to 
represent distinct particular things subsisting by themselves; in which the supposed, or 
confused, idea of substance, such as it is, is always the first and chief. 
 
                                                
17 T. REID, An inquiry into the human mind on the principles of common sense, Bell & Bradfute, Edinburgh 18106 
[1764]. 
18 I thank Dr. Samuele Tadini at the Centro Internazionale di Studi Rosminiani for information about 
books by Reid in Rosmini’s library. The French translation of An inquiry there present is Recherches sur 
l'entendement humain, Jean Meyer, Amsterdam, 1768. 
19 J. LOCKE, An essay concerning human understanding, Thomas Tegg, London 182525, p. 340. 
20 ivi, p. 97. 
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Here the expression «distinct particular things» is perhaps not entirely clear, as in 
other passages Locke applies the term ”substance” to appellatives, i.e. to a number of 
similar objects, rather than to a single object21: 
 
But speaking in that place of the ideas of distinct substances, such as man, horse, gold, 
&c., I say they are made up of certain combinations of simple ideas, which 
combinations are looked upon, each of them, as one simple idea, though they are 
many; and we shall call it by one name of substance, though made up of modes, from 
the custom of supposing a substratum, wherein that combination does subsist. So that 
in this paragraph I only give an account of the idea of distinct substances, such as oak, 
elephant, iron, &c., how they are made up of distinct complications of modes, yet they 
are looked on as one idea, called by one name, as making distinct sorts of substance. 
 
If only substances have proper names, this last quotation would indicate that 
Locke does not differentiate between proper names and appellatives, which seems odd. 
However, the way Locke describes the intimate relation between substances and 
essences indicates that proper names do refer to single individuals22: 
 
It is true, I have often mentioned a real essence, distinct in substances, from those 
abstract ideas of them, which I call their nominal essence. By this real essence, I mean, 
that real constitution of any thing, which is the foundation of all those properties that 
are combined in, and are constantly found to co-exist with, the nominal essence; that 
particular constitution which every thing has within itself, without any relation to any 
thing without it. 
 
So, although Rosmini is highly critical of Locke’s general view of the origin of 
ideas, in particular that of substance23, the two philosophers appear to be on common 
ground in assuming that a genuinely proper name, i.e. not an appellative, refers to the 
essential individuality of a single, particular being. 
In Rosmini the idea of substance, stripped of any quality, appears self-evident and 
unproblematic24. In Locke it is elusive and uncertain25, in favour of the specific complex 
of simple ideas that he calls ”nominal essence”. As these simple ideas are qualitative 
attributes, it lies close at hand to interpret Locke as being in line with the theory that 
proper names are connoting and descriptive. However, Locke does not explicitly write 
about the connotation of proper names, or about ostensive naming for that matter, so 
                                                
21 ivi, p. 192 n. 
22 ivi, p. 323. 
23 A. ROSMINI-SERBATI, Nuovo saggio, cit., pp. 15–32. 
24 ivi., p. 18. 
25 «I confess, there is another idea which would be of general use for mankind to have, as it is of general 
talk, as if they had it; and that is the idea of substance, which we neither have, nor can have, by sensation 
or reflection. If nature took care to provide us any ideas, we might well expect they should be such, as by 
our own faculties, we cannot procure to ourselves: but we see, on the contrary, that since by those ways 
whereby our ideas are brought into our minds, this is not, we have no such clear idea at all, and, 
therefore, signify nothing by the word substance, but only an uncertain supposition of we know not what, 
i. e. of something whereof we have no particular distinct positive idea, which we take to be the 
substratum, or support of those ideas we know». J. LOCKE, An essay concerning human understanding, cit., pp. 
44–45. 
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the question should probably be left open. At any rate, Rosmini does not seem to have 
got his understanding of proper names from Locke. 
It is likewise implausible that Rosmini has taken over his views from Hobbes. 
Mill26 discusses Hobbes’s understanding of the referents of names in general and 
critcises his alleged claim that they are in the first place ideas, not things. It can be 
discussed whether Mill gives an entirely correct picture of Hobbes’s theory. According 
to Hungerland and Vick27, Hobbes distinguishes between the denotation of singular 
names and the communicative significance of whole utterances depending on the 
appropriate arrangement of words. The latter interpretation of Hobbes seems akin to 
Kripke’s concession that the statement «Hesperus is Phosphorus» could raise an 
empirical issue, regardless of the fact that the two names are coreferential28. However, 
Hobbes is not mentioned in Naming and necessity, apparently for good reasons. He does 
not say very much about proper names but exemplifies them by listing together ”he who 
wrote the Iliad”, ”Homer”, ”this”, and ”that”29. Evidently, the important aspect here is 
the restriction of the referents of proper names to singular individuals30, not whether 
description suffices to fix the referent. The distinction between proper and common 
names in Hobbes does not seem to imply any succinct difference in the role of 
connotativity31, the striking feature of Reid’s, Rosmini’s and Mill’s views of proper 
names. 
Considering the general signficance of St. Thomas, it is natural to ask whether he 
might have inspired Rosmini on this point. Thomas is mentioned many times in Nuovo 
Saggio, but not on the pages where Rosmini presents his view of proper names. Of 
course, there could have been a thomistic influence anyway. 
The non-descriptive theory of referent-fixing hinges on the ontological 
presupposition of substantial individualities, to which one can refer without the use of 
any connotating common name. In Summa theologica (part I, question 13, article 9), St. 
Thomas discusses the equivocal function of the terms ”God” and ”sun” as both proper 
and common names. As proper names, each of them refers to a unique suppositum. As 
common names they refer to the divine or solar natura that can be hypothetically 
conceived of as existing in many supposita. St. Thomas writes32: 
 
For instance this name lion is properly communicated to all things of the same nature 
as lion […] To know, however, what names are properly communicable, we must 
consider that every form existing in the singular subject, by which it is individualized, 
is common to many either in reality, or in idea; as human nature is common to many 
                                                
26 J.S. MILL, A system of logic, cit., p. 27 ff. 
27 I.C. HUNGERLAND, G.R. VICK, Hobbes’s theory of signification, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 1973, 
vol. 11, pp. 459–482. I.C. HUNGERLAND, G.R. VICK, Hobbes’s theory of language, speech, and reasoning, in: I.C. 
Hungerland, G.R. Vick (eds.), Thomas Hobbes. Part 1 of De Corpore, Abaris Books, New York, 1981, pp. 9–
169. 
28 S.A. KRIPKE, Naming and necessity, cit., pp. 20–21. 
29 De Corpore, I, 2:9: «…alia singulis rebus propria, ut Is qui scripsit Iliadem, Homerus, Hic, Ille.» T. HOBBES, 
Computatio sive logica: Logic (Part I of De Corpore), Abaris Books, New York, 1981[1655], English translation 
by A. Martinich, ed. by I.C. Hungerland, G.R. Vick. 
30 See also De Corpore I, 2:11 on individual as opposed to universal names. 
31 S. DUNCAN, Hobbes, signification, and insignificant names, Hobbes Studies, 2011, vol. 24, pp. 158–178. 
32 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, The “Summa Theologica” of St. Thomas Aquinas, part I, literally translated by Fathers 
of the English Dominican Province, Burns, Oates & Washbourne, London 19202. 
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in reality, and in idea; whereas the nature of the sun is not common to many in reality, 
but only in idea; for the nature of the sun can be understood as existing in many 
subjects; and the reason is because the mind understands the nature of every species by 
abstraction from the singular. [- - -]  
 
But if any name were given to signify God not as to His nature but as to His suppositum, 
accordingly as He is considered as this something, that name would be absolutely 
incommunicable; as, for instance, perhaps the Tetragrammaton among the Hebrews; 
and this is like giving a name to the sun as signifying this individual thing. 
 
Clearly, the referent natura is thought of as being within grasp by connotations, 
whereas the suppositum corresponds to the Rosminian individualità 33 , to which an 
individual’s proper name is directly attached by some kind of ostensive act (”this 
something”, or pointing at the sun)34. 
This similarity between St. Thomas’s view and that of Rosmini concerning proper 
names makes it natural to suspect a causal link, although not explicitly pointed out by 
Rosmini. Morover, considering St. Thomas’s general dependence on Aristotle, it is 
noteworthy that the non-descriptive mode of understanding proper names may have its 
roots already in the Antiquity. According to Searle35, a germ can be found in Plato. In 
the dialogue Theaetetus, Socrates says36: 
 
[…] I heard in my dream that the primeval letters or elements out of which you and I 
and all other things are compounded, have no reason or explanation; you can only 
name them, but no predicate can be either affirmed or denied of them […] But none 
of these primeval elements can be defined; they can only be named, for they have 
nothing but a name, and the things which are compounded of them, as they are 
complex, are expressed by a combination of names, for the combination of names is 
the essence of a definition. 
 
In the seventh (Zeta) book of the Metaphysics, Part 15 discusses the lack of definition 
of individuals. In one passage Aristotle asserts the impossibility of defining the individual 
sun or the human beings Socrates and Cleon. He seems to hold that the names ”sun”, 
”Socrates” and ”Cleon” refer to substances independently of specific attributes. The 
example ”sun” is particularly interesting in apparently forecasting the above quotation 
from St. Thomas. The Aristotle scholar E.E. Ryan interprets this Metaphysics passage as 
indicating a non-descriptive theory of referencing37. 
Plausible as Ryan’s suggestion may seem, it is noteworthy that in Nuovo Saggio I the 
chapter specifically devoted to Plato and Aristotle (Section 4, Chapter 1) does not treat 
the topic of proper names. In Section 3, Chapter 4, articles 1–12, where the subject of 
                                                
33 A. ROSMINI-SERBATI, Nuovo saggio, cit., p. 105. 
34 According to Christian tradition, the referent of the name ”God” has been made evident by repeated 
ostensive revelations, although the Bible uses a variety of coreferential nominal expressions, e.g. Exodus 3, 
Exodus 33, Matt. 3, 2 Pet 1: 16–18. 
35  J.R. SEARLE, Proper names and descriptions, in: P. EDWARDS (ed.), The encyclopedia of philosophy, vol. 5, 
Macmillan Publishing Co., New York 1967, pp. 487–491. 
36 PLATO, Theaetetus, in: B. JOWETT, The dialogues of Plato translated into English, vol. 4. Oxford University Press, 
London 18923, p. 268. 
37 ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, translated by M. Furth, Hackett Publishing Co., Indianapolis, 1985. E.E. RYAN, 
Aristotle on proper names, Apeiron, 1981, vol. 15, pp. 38–47. 
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proper names is focused upon, Plato and Aristotle are only mentioned in one footnote 
each, neither of them for favouring the view that proper names are fundamentally non-
connotative. Aristotle is there invoked to support the opinion that common names 
precede the appearance of proper names in children’s acquisition of language; Plato, in 
Cratylus, for claiming that the oldest names of natural languages indicate the nature or 
quality of things, not their individuality. Against this background, it is unlikely that 
Rosmini has obtained his elaborated view of referencing directly from the less developed 
arguments of Antiquity. 
The following conclusions are suggested: 
1. The opinion, generally attributed to J.S. Mill (1843), that proper names are 
fundamentally non-connotative is well developed by Antonio Rosmini in Nuovo Saggio 
(1830). 
2. The same idea of proper names can be found earlier in Thomas Reid and 
briefly in St. Thomas, with subtle and somewhat obscure roots in Plato and Aristotle. 
3. It cannot be concluded with certainty from where Rosmini has derived his 
opinion. For philological reasons, Reid does not seem to be a source. More plausibly, 
Rosmini may have been inspired by St. Thomas. 
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